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STRAYING WILD HORSES AND THE RANGE
LANDOWNER: THE SEARCH FOR PEACEFUL
COEXISTENCE
Alfred W. Buckley*
William R. Buckley**
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1971 Congress passed Public Law 92-195, the Wild Free-Roaming
Horses and -Burros Act,' to preserve a vanishing symbol of American
pioneer heritage.' Before this statute was enacted, wild horses and burros s
were in danger of extinction. 4 Today the success of the Act has prompted
much controversy as to whether wild horses overpopulate the public
rangelands 6 in the Western United States. 6 Private landowners adjacent to
federal regions often complain that wild horses "stray" onto their parcels
and consume their forage and water.7 While owners have the right to use
and enjoy their property free from incursions,8 Congress intended protection of a living emblem of the Nation's spirit to be of paramount
importance. 9
B.S., Purdue University, 1977; M.S.I.A., Purdue University, 1978; J.D., Indiana University '
1981. Partner, Buckley and Buckley, Lafayette, Indiana.
** A.B., Indiana University, 1980; J.D., Indiana University, 1983.
1. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) [hereinafter cited as "the Act" or "the Wild
Horses Act."]. The Supreme Court has unanimously upheld the Act as an appropriate exercise of
congressional power under the Property Clause, U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. Kleppe v. New Mexico,
426 U.S. 529 (1976). For careful examination of this decision, see Gaetke, CongressionalDiscretion
Underthe Property Clause, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 381 (1981); Note, ConstitutionalLaw-Expansionof
National Power Under the Property Clause: FederalRegulation of Wildlife, 12 LAND & WATER
L.REV. 181 (1977); Note, Wild Horses and Burros Act Preempts State Authority, 17 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 337 (1977); Comment, Constitutionalityofthe Free Roaming Wild HorsesandBurros
Act: The Ecosystem andthe PropertyClause in Kleppe v. New Mexico, 7 ENVT'L. L. 137 (1976); FreeRoaming Horses Act Valid Under Property Clause, 62 A.B.A.J. 1030 (1976).
Congress is presently considering legislation that would amend the Act's management, adoption
and criminal provisions. S.457, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S1068-70 (daily ed. Feb. 3,
1983). See infra notes 17, 23, 26, 29 & 77.
2. See 16 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976).
3. This article uses "horses" to denote both wild horses and wild burros, unless otherwise
indicated.
4. See infra notes 14, 15, 19, 20 & accompanying text.
5. H.R. REP. No. 1122, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1978).
6. These states include Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico,
Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT & FOREST SERVICE,
*

THIRD REPORT TO CONGRESS, ADMINISTRATION OF THE WILD FREE-ROAMING HORSE AND BURRO

ACT 8-9 (1980) [hereinafter cited as THIRD REPORT TO CONGRESS].
7. See infra note 49 & accompanying text.
8. See C. SMITH & R. BOYER, SURVEY OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 171 (2d ed. 1971).
9. H. CONF. REP. No. 681, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
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This article will examine the conflicting interrelationships between
wild horses and private property holders. An analysis of the Wild Horses
Act and the relevant case law will demonstrate that the prevailing method
used to eliminate the "straying problem"-extensive governmental removal of horses from public and private lands-countermands the protective purposes of the Act and of related public lands statutes. 10 So long as
intensive culling remains the standard agency practices to relieve straying,11 current mechanisms must be improved to reconcile removal and the
Act's goals.12 This article suggests various superior management systems
and several innovative approaches to balance the needs of landowners and
of wild horses.
II.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

An estimated two million wild horses roamed the Western United
States at the turn of the century. 3 Populations were decimated as business
interests hunted herds to sell to fertilizer and pet food companies.1" The
slaughter reached such appalling proportions during the 1950's that wild
horse extinction became a frightfully real possibility.1 5 To deter commercial destruction of the horses, Congress enacted the "Wild Horse Annie"
Act16 in 1959. This statute prohibited the use of aircraft or motor vehicles
in stalking wild horses.17 For a variety of reasons, this provision did not
NEws2159,2160; H.R. REP. No. 480, 92d Cong., 1stSess. 4-5 (1971); S. REP. No. 242, 92d Cong., Ist
Sess., reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2149, 2151.
10. See infra notes 53-57 & accompanying text.
11. See infra note 135.
12. Some of this article's proposed alternatives, such as adoption incentives and "peak stray
roundups," could operate within the federal government's present "management-intensive" posture to
reduce the need for massive interference with horse populations. See infra notes 78-86, 95-122, 135 &
accompanying text. Other suggested solutions, such as cooperative agreements, fencing and designated
ranges, would serve as alternatives to large-scale horse regulation. See infranotes 87-93, 109,123-37 &
accompanying text. The result of all the propositions should be to protect the animals from continuous
human intervention while eliminating the straying problem, so long as the techniques function within
the mandates of the Wild Horses Act.
13. H.R. REP. No. 480, supra note 9, at 3; S. REP. No. 242, supra note 9, at 2149.
14. S. REP. No. 242, supranote 9, at 2149; S. REP. No. 802,86th Cong., Ist Sess., reprintedin
1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2253,2253-54. Airplanes and motor vehicles were the primary
tools used to capture the horses. S. REP. No. 802, supra, at 2254.
15. Johnston, The Fight to Save a Memory, 50 TEx. L. REV. 1055, 1055 (1972).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 47 (1976). The statute's popular title incorporated the nickname of the late
Velma B. Johnston, founder of Wild Horse Organized Assistance (WHOA!), who successfully fought
for the provision's passage. H. RYDEN, AMERICA'S LAST WILD HORSas 215-24, 281 (rev. ed. 1978).
17. 18 U.S.C. § 47 (1976). Violators may be subject to fines of up to $500 and/or six months
imprisonment. Id. § 47(a)-(b). In 1976 Congress amended the Wild Horses Act to permit the
Secretaries of Interior and Agriculture to authorize the use of helicopters and motor vehicles in
managing or in transporting the horses. 16 U.S.C. § 1338a (1976). Legislation pending before
Congress would also allow "the head of any Executive Department or Agency administering Federal
lands" to utilize helicopters and motor vehicles in wild horse regulation. S. 457, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. §
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effectively protect the animals."8 During the 1960's the carnage continued
20
unabated.1 9 Additional legislation was essential to preserve the horses.

After a deluge of public support,2" Congress passed the Wild Horses Act.
The Wild Horses Act declared that wild horses and burros were
"living symbols of the historic and pioneer spirit of the West. ' 22 Noting
that horse populations were "fast disappearing from the American
scene," 23 Congress mandated that wild horses "be protected from capture,

branding, harassment, or death."2 To achieve these goals, the Act
empowered the Secretaries of Interior and Agriculture 25 to protect and
control wild horses through various management techniques 28 as an
9, 129 CONG. REC. S1068, S1070 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1983). This would enable governmental officials
other than the Secretaries of Interior and Agriculture (or their authorized agents) to cull wild horses
without the Secretaries' approval, pursuant to "any laws pertaining to management of Federal lands."
Id. This proposed amendment, if enacted, would directly contradict § 1333(b) of the Act which
empowers only the Secretaries of Interior and Agriculture (or their authorized personnel) to remove
"excess" horses from the public range. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1333(b) (2), 1338(a) (1976 & Supp. V 198 1).
Of course, the Secretaries could authorize other Federal Departments to conduct roundups, but such
agencies cannot cull the horses on their own initiative. See id. §§ 1333(a)-(b), 1338(a) (1976 & Supp.

V 1981).
References throughout this article to the "Secretaries" will be to the Secretaries of Interior and
Agriculture, unless otherwise noted.
18. Even though this statute eliminated the most convenient roundup techniques, hunting
continued. H.R. REP. No. 480, supra note 9,at 3. The Wild Horse Annie Act was to be enforced by
local officials who were less than vigorous in its implementation. Johnston, supra note 15, at 1059. Man
proceeded to encroach upon wild horse habitats by fencing watering holes and grazing areas and by
diverting and depleting natural sources of water. Id. No centralized federal agency protected the horses
from these dangers. H.R. REP. No. 480, supra note 9, at 3-4.
19. S. REP. No. 242, supra note 9, at 2150.
20. H.R. REP. No. 480, supra note 9, at 3-4.
21. See H. RYDEN, supra note 16, at 279-84.
22. 16 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976).
23. Id. Congress is presently reviewing a resolution that would delete this language, substituting
a federal policy that would sustain a "healthy [wild horse] population base" to be"managed under the
Sess. § 1, 129 CONG. REC. S1068, S1069 (daily ed.
principle of multiple use." S. 457, 98th Cong., 1st
Feb. 3, 1983). Since 1971 the major controversy surrounding the Act has been whether the statutory
Rrotection has created horse overpopulation on the federal range. H.R. REP. No. 1122, supranote 5, at
21.
24. 16 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976).
25. The Secretaries have delegated responsibility for the Act's enforcement to the Bureau of
Land Management (BLM) and the Forest Service, respectively. 16 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1976). The
BLM primarily implements the Act, since 95 percent of wild horses roam on public lands within its
jurisdiction. THIRD REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 6, at v.
26. The BLM's management has emphasized removal of"excess" horses from public lands. See
16 U.S.C. § 1333 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); see infra note 135. Once culled, the horses are most
frequently placed in BLM holding facilities pending adoption by private citizens through the agency's
national "Adopt-a-Horse" program, which began in the Spring of 1976. BUREAU OF LAND
MANAGEMENT, FOUR-YEAR AUTHORIZATION REPORT TO THE CONGRESS FOR FISCAL YEARS 19821985, at 93 (1980) [hereinafter cited as BLM FOUR-YEAR AUTHORIZATION REPORT]. An individual
or organization may adopt no more than four horses annually, subject to written authorization from the
Secretaries that a greater number could be humanely maintained. 16 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(2)(B) (Supp. V

32
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"integral part of the natural system of the public lands. 27 Criminal
sanctions, similar to those in the Wild Horse Annie Act,2 8 were intended to
insulate the animals from commercial depradation.2 9
While the Act is designed to apply to the public lands, wild horses tend
to roam within broad "home ranges" which could overlap with private
property. Changes in a given area's habitat may force herds to migrate

1981). After one year of humane care, the government may transfer title of the animals to the adopter.
Id. § 1333(c). More than 35,000 horses and burros have been adopted as of September 198 1. BUREAU
OF LAND MANAGEMENT & FOREST SERVICE, FOURTH REPORT TO CONGRESS, ADMINISTRATION OF

THE WILD FREE-ROAMING HORSE AND BURRO ACT 5

(1982) [hereinafter cited as FOURTH REPORTTO

CONGRESS]. There were applications outstanding for 43,000 animals as of April, 1980. THIRD REPORT
TO CONGRESS,

supra note 6, at 13.

BLM horse regulation should maximize protection of the horses while balancing equine interests
with other environmental amenities. Management must be at the "minimal feasible level," using
agency discretion to adjust the intensities of various land uses, including horses, to achieve a "thriving
natural ecological balance." See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1333(a)-(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Pending legislation
would change the management criteria by striking the "minimal feasible" language from § 1333(a)
and by allowing "excess" wild horses to be rounded up and sold to commercial entities. S. 457, 98th
Cong., Ist Sess. §§ 3(a), (b)(2)(C)-(D), 129 CONG. REC. S1068, S1069 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1983). For
further discussion of this proposal, see infra note 77 & accompanying text.
Another management method involves creation of specific wild horse ranges. 16 U.S.C. § 1333(a)
(1976). For an analysis of such refuges, see infra notes 126-37 & accompanying text.
A definitive investigation of the management provisions is beyond the scope of this article. For a
more extensive examination, see Buckley & Buckley, The AppropriateDegree ofManagement Under
the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act, 19 CAL. W.L. REV. 419 (1983): Note, Good
Intentions Gone "Estray"--theWild, Free-RoamingHorse and Burro Act, 16 LAND & WATER L.
REV.

525 (1981).

27. 16 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976).
28. See supra note 17.
29. Penalties of up to $2000 and/or one year imprisonment may be levied against any person
convicted of unauthorized removal or conversion of wild horses, or against anyone guilty of killing,
harassing, or selling wild horses or their remains for commercial processing. 16 U.S.C. § 1338(a)
(1976). Persons authorized by the Secretaries to sell horse remains for commercial products, under one
bill currently before Congress, would be insulated from these sanctions. S. 457, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. §
8(a), 129 CONG. REC. S1068, S1070 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1983). If enacted, the legislation would also
stiffen punishment for repeat offenders. Id.
A recent court decision upheld the constitutionality of the Act's criminal provisions. United States
v. Johnson, 685 F.2d 337 (9th Cir. 1982). Few cases have invoked the Act's penalties. See, e.g., United
States v. Hughes, 626 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Christiansen, 504 F. Supp. 364 (D.
Nev. 1980). Convictions are rare. See Bureau of Land Management, Fiscal Year 1981 Program
Accomplishments, Wild Horse & Burro Report 2 (Nov. 1981) (newsletter) [hereinafter cited as Wild
Horse & Burro Report] (1860 adopters and 3750 horses were inspected for possible violations of the
Act in 1980, and of those prosecuted, there were no convictions). Occasionally state animal anti-cruelty
statutes have been applied to persons who allowed their recently adopted horses to starve to death. State
v. Mitts, 608 S.W.2d 131 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); State v. DeHart, 42 Or. App. 837,601 P.2d 917(1979)
(affirming mem. defendant's conviction under state law for cruelty to animals), rev'd on othergrounds
andreversalaff'd sub nom., 55 Or. App. 254, 637 P.2d 1311 (1981) (defendant denied due process of
law because of inadequate legal counsel). If title had not yet passed from the BLM to the private
custodian, as apparently was the situation in the above state cases, then the Act's more stringent
sanctions should have been applied in federal district court. See 16 U.S.C. § 1338(a)(6) (1976); 43
C.F.R. § 4760.2(c), (g), (1) (1981).
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beyond their normal territorial boundaries.3 0 Since much of the rangeland
throughout the West is an unfenced, public-private "checkerboard,""1
wild horses might regularly stray onto privately owned property. How the

Act responds to this difficulty is discussed in the following sections.
III.

STRAYING WILD HORSES: STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS

According to 16 U.S.C. § 1334:
[i]f wild free-roaming horses or burros stray from public lands
onto privately owned land, the owners of such land may inform
the nearest Federal marshall or agent of the Secretary, who shall
arrange to have the animals removed. In no event shall such wild
free-roaming horses and burros be destroyed except by the agents

of the Secretary.

2

This provision attempts to harmonize the landowner's rights to use and

enjoy his private property' s and the Act's protection of wild horses from
human manipulation and destruction. While the constitutional basis for3§4
1334's regulation of conduct on private lands remains an open issue,
several persuasive theories suggest that Congress was empowered to
extend federal control beyond public boundaries.3 5
30.

M.

T.

& K.

COLLINS, TECHNICAL NOTE, WILD, FREE-ROAMING HOR-

SES-STATULS OF PRESENT KNOWLEDGE

32-33 (1977). Scientific studies have indicated that "home

ZARN,

HELLER

ranges" are relatively rigid and defined, subject to seasonal variations caused by higher population
densities and insufficient food supplies. Id. at 33.
31. The "checkerboard" consists of intermingling public and private tracts. Coggins & Hensley,
Constitutional Limits on FederalPower to ProtectandManage Wildlife: Is the EndangeredSpecies
Act Endangered?,61 IowA L. REV. 1099, 1104 (1976). This pattern of ownership is a byproduct of
federal land grants to railroads constructing the transcontinental railroad. Note, supra note 26,at 534
n. 71.
32. 16 U.S.C. § 1334 (1976). Such removal should be done "within a reasonable time." T
Quarter Circle Ranches, Inc. v. Watt, No. 81-110, at 12 (D. Nev. Jan. 29, 1982), enforcement stayed
pending settlement, No. 81-110 (D. Nev. July 7, 1982) (interim order).
33. See supra note 9 & accompanying text.
34. The Supreme Court has specifically declined to decide whether the Property Clause, U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl.
2, "empowers Congress to protect animals on private lands." Kleppe v. New
Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 546 (1976).
35. An analysis of the constitutional authorities upon which § 1334 is based is beyond the scope
of this article. Two commentators suggest that Congress' powers to regulate wild horses on public and
private property may be found in the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl.
3, and in Congress'
"inherent power" to protect and preserve animals which are historic symbols of our national heritage.
Coggins & Hensley, supra note 31, at 1130-35, 1139-43. This latter argument, while persuasive, has
not been definitely determined by the courts. Id. at 1141. However, no judicial precedent appears to
preclude its existence. Id. at 1142-43.
Another commentator offers an attractive theory to legitimize constitutionally § 1334's regulation
of wild horses on private lands. This approach, suggested by analogy from the nuisance analysis utilized
in Camfieldv. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897), "weigh [s] the utility of the congressional policy for
the use of federal lands" against "the degree of imposition on the owners of nonfederal property."
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The legislative history did not evaluate § 1334 in terms of the straying
problem. 8 Agency regulations37 essentially echo the Act's phraseology.3 8
Therefore, the language in question must be interpreted from the face of
the provision and from judicial explanations.
A.

The Leading Case: Roaring Springs

The foremost case defining the parameters of § 1334 is Roaring
Springs Associates v. Andrus.3 9 The plaintiff organization owned unfenced land in eastern Oregon. When wild horses roamed onto its parcels,
the association asked federal agents from the Department of Interior to
remove the trespassing animals. After the government refused, the
plaintiff petitioned a United States Magistrate to issue a mandamus
order.' 0 The court ruled that the defendants owed the private landowner a
"ministerial duty" under § 1334 to return the wild horses to the public
range.41 The government's defenses of sovereign immunity, 42 of incorpoGaetke, supra note 1, at 398. Using the author's first consideration, the Act's legislative history
indicated that federal protection of the horses was essential to prevent their extinction. H.R. REP. No.
480, supranote 9, at 3-4; S. REP. No. 242, supra note 9, at 2150. Applying the second element, § 1334
imposes minimal federal interference with uses of private property, since the provision provides
landowners a convenient, inexpensive means of removing straying wild horses from their parcels.
Roaring Springs Assoc. v. Andrus, 471 F.Supp. 522,525-26 (D. Or. 1978). According to this balancing
analysis, this meagre intrusion, coupled with the compelling federal policy protecting wild horses from
depradation by man, would be a "needful" regulation "respecting the federal land," and thus would be
an appropriate exercise of the Property Clause. But cf. Gaetke, supra note 1, at 398, 399-401
(concluding that the Act's ban of private roundups on all nonfederal lands is "unnecessarily broad" and
might not be "'needful' regulation 'respecting the federal lands'" under the Property Clause).
36. H. CONF. REP. No. 681, supranote 9, at 2160; S. REP. No. 242,supra note 9, at 2153. While
committee reports were silent on the straying problem, several Congressmen mentioned this aspect of §
1334 in testimony at congressional hearings and in introducing various resolutions. See, e.g., Protection
of Wild Horses on Public Lands: Hearings on H.R. 795, H.R. 5375 and Related Bills Before the
Subcomm. on PublicLands of theHouse Comm. on Interiorand InsularAffairs, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
18 (1971) (statement of Gilbert Gude, U.S. Representative, Maryland) [hereinafter cited as
ProtectionHearings];Id. at 27 (statement of Lester L. Wolff, U.S. Representative, New York); 117
CONG. REc. 5028, 5786 (1971) (statements of Sen. Jackson and Sen. Nelson, respectively).
37. 43 C.F.R. §§ 4700.0-1 to 4760.2 (1981).
38. Id. § 4750.3 (1981). The regulations still require removal only from private lands enclosed in
a "legal fence" or unfenced property in a "no-fence" district, which is a region "where the private
landowner is not required by State statute to fence the private land to protect it from trespass by
domestic livestock." Id. The continued existence of this regulation is confusing, since the Act does not
restrict § 1334's application in this way, and since the court in Roaring Springs Assoc. y. Andrus, 471 F.
Supp. 522 (D. Or. 1978), declared § 4750.3 invalid as contrary to the statutory mandates. See infra
note 44 & accompanying text.
39. 471 F. Supp. 522 (D. Or. 1978). This case is briefly discussed in Note, Wild Horses Off
Private Lands, 19 NAT. RESOURCES J. 721 (1979).
40. Roaring Springs Assoc. v. Andrus, 471 F. Supp. at 524.
41. Id. at 526.
42. Defendants argued that insufficient funds were available to implement the Act's directives,
requiring monies from the public treasury to be used to remove the straying horses. The doctrine of
sovereign immunity would bar such a siphoning. Id. In rejecting this view, the court found that
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rating state estray laws into the Act, 43 and of limiting the scope of § 13 344

did not neutralize this mandatory requirement.
Undoubtedly the court was correct in stating that agency discretion is
inappropriate when property owners request removal of strays. 5 Congress
must have intended § 1334 to protect wild horses from private, unauthorized culling"6 by allowing landowners an inexpensive and expedient
method of retrieving the horses.4 Since the Act was primarily enacted to
prevent the atrocities of private roundups,48 it is unlikely that Congress

would have permitted § 1334 to function at the whim of agency officials.
The "straying horses" problem has generated much of the litigation
involving the Act.4 ' Many of these decisions rely upon RoaringSpringsor
similar reasoning. However, the "ministerial duty" declared in Roaring
Springs has been improperly extended beyond private property lines to
intensify horse regulation on the public tracts.
B.

The Usurpation of § 1334: Excessive Horse Management

In Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Andrus, 50 the federal
adequate revenue existed to cull the horses from the plaintiff's property. Id. at 526-27.
43. Id. at 524. The government reasoned that the Act permitted states to define "stray" in §
1334. As the court correctly noted, neither the Act nor the legislative history suggests that § 1334, or
any of the Act's provisions, should be implemented differently among states. Id. at 524-25. The
Supreme Court ruled that the Act would override conflicting state statutes under the Supremacy
2. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529,543-45 (1976). This implies
Clause, U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl.
that the Act was intended to apply uniformly across state lines, regardless ofvarying local philosophies.
44. The BLM declared that its duty to retrieve horses extended only to private lands enclosed by
a "legal fence" or unfenced in a so-called "no-fence district" as defined in 43 C.F.R. § 4750.3 (1978).
Roaring Springs Assoc. v. Andrus, 471 F. Supp. at 525. The court ruled this regulation ultravires as
inconsistent with the Act. Id. Section 1334 applies to all private landowners, not merely to fenced
properties. 16 U.S.C. § 1334 (1976); T Quarter Circle Ranches, Inc. v. Watt, No. 81 -110, at 7 (D. Nev.
Jan. 29, 1982), enforcement stayed pendingsettlement, No. 81-110 (D. Nev. July 7, 1982) (interim
order); Roaring Springs Assoc. v. Andrus, 471 F. Supp. at 525.
45. Roaring Springs Assoc. v. Andrus, 471 F. Supp. at 526. The Act's language is clearly
compulsory. See 16 U.S.C. § 1334 (1976). "Shall" is generally imperative in statutes. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1233 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
46. The Act prohibits unauthorized private roundups under the criminal provisions. 16 U.S.C. §
1338(a) (1976).
47. See Roaring Springs Assoc. v. Andrus, 471 F. Supp. at 525-26.
48. See supra notes 14-15, 19-20, 23-24, 29 & accompanying text.
49. See, e.g., T Quarter Circle Ranches, Inc. v. Watt, No. 81-110 (D. Nev. Jan. 29, 1982),
enforcement stayed pendingsettlement, No. 81-110 (D. Nev. July 7, 1982) (interim order); C-Punch
Corp. v. Andrus, No. 80-266 (D. Nev. July 29, 1981), modified, C-Punch Corp. v. Watt, No. 80-266
(D. Nev. Nov. 12, 1981) (striking portion of July 29, 1981 decree requiring BLM to remove 225
horses); Fallini v. Andrus, No. 79-233 (D. Nev. July 9, 1981) (dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction), complaint refiled sub nom. Fallini v. Watt, No. 81-536, (D. Nev. Aug. 21, 1981);
Mountain States Legal Found.v. Andrus, 12ENvTL.L.REP. 20105 (ENVTL. L. INsT.) (D.Wyo. 1981);
Roaring Springs Assoc. v. Andrus, 471 F. Supp. 522 (D. Or. 1978).
50. 12 ENVTL. L. REP. 20105 (ENVTL. L. INST.) (D. Wyo. 1981), amended, Mountain States
Legal Found. v. Watt, No. 79-275 (D. Wyo. Feb. 19, 1982).
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district court of Wyoming utilized comparable factual circumstances-wild horses straying onto private parcels-to launch exorbitant
regulation amounting to a blatant distortion of the purposes and requirements of § 1334, which was not even cited in either the original or amended
opinions. 51
One of the management considerations in § 1333 requires wild horse
control to achieve and maintain a "thriving natural ecological balance" on
the public lands. 52 Congress desired this phrase to operate within two
broader public rangeland statutes: the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 5 (FLPMA), and the Public Rangelands Improvement
Act of 19785" (PRIA). FLPMA and PRIA serve to rejuvenate degenerating range conditions 55 through a comprehensive system of "multiple uses"
and "sustained yield."5 Within such a unified structure, all public land
57
policies should blend to produce ecological balance among all uses.
In Mountain States Judge Kerr endowed "thriving natural ecological

51. Surprisingly, the original opinion cited only one of the Act's provisions, § 1333(a). Mountain
States Legal Found. v. Andrus, 12 ENVTL. L. REP. at 20105. In an amended order, the court cited
generally to § 1332(0 and § 1333. Mountain States Legal Found. v.Watt, No. 79-275, at 2-3 (D. Wyo.
Feb. 19, 1982).
52. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1333(a), (b)(2) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
53. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-82 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
54. Pub. L. No. 95-514,92 Stat. 1803 (1978) (codified in scattered sections of 16 & 43 U.S.C.).
55. According to BLM research, 135 million of approximately 171 million acres of public lands
produced below potential as of January 1975. U.S. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS, PUBLIC RANGELANDS CONTINUE TO DETERIORATE 1, 5 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
PUBLIC RANGELANDS CONTINUE TO DETERIORATE]; BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, RANGE
CONDITION REPORT PREPARED FOR THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 11-12 (1975). A

1977 study traced most of this deteriorated state to poor livestock grazing management and the lack of
land management plans for 107 million acres. PUBLIC RANGELANDS CONTINUE TO DETERIORATE,
supra, at 1, 4-5.
56. FLPMA defines "multiple use" as:
the management of the public lands and their various resource values so that they are
utilized in the combination that will best meet the present and future needs of the American
people; making the most judicious use of the land for some or all of these resources....
[Multiple use includes] a combination of balanced and diverse resource uses that takes into
account the long-term needs of future generations for renewable and nonrenewable
resources .... and [includes] harmonious and coordinated management of the various
resources without permanent impairment of the productivity of the land and the quality of
the environment with consideration being given to the relative values of the resources and
not necessarily to the combination of uses that will give the greatest economic return or the
greatest unit output.
43 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (1976). "Sustained yield" involves "the achievement and maintenance in
perpetuity of a high-level annual or regular periodic output of the various renewable resources of the
public lands consistent with multiple use." Id. § 1702(h) (1976). For an exhaustive critique of multiple
use and sustained yield standards, seeCoggins, OfSuccotashSyndromes and VacuousPlatitudes:The
Meaningof "MultipleUse, Sustained Yield"for PublicLand Management, 53 U. COLO. L. REV. 229
(1982).
57. For a detailed explanation of the interrelationships of FLPMA, PRIA and the Wild Horses
Act, see Buckley & Buckley, supra note 26, at 433-39.
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balance" with more regulatory overtones. The court interpreted § 1333(a)
to command culling of all wild horses from "the checkerboard grazing
lands" in the Rock Springs, Wyoming region, except for those horses that
the plaintiffs voluntarily acceded to remain.58
The court erroneously assumed that § 1333(a) of the Act compels the
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) to round up wild horses from both
public and private tracts whenever the animals stray onto the landowner's

parcels. Section 1334 is designed to remedy Mountain States' factual
situation, 59 but it applies only when wild horses stray onto private lands.60
58. Mountain States Legal Found. v. Andrus, 12 ENVTL. L. REP. at 20105. In this case, wild
horses had strayed and grazed on plaintiff's private lands. The BLM had conducted few roundups in the
area between 1972 and 1976. According to BLM statistics, populations increased from 2364 to 6129
horses between 1972 and 1979. Id. Almost half of these horses had wandered onto plaintiff's property
during the seven year period. Id.The court did not mention whether the number of livestock grazing the
Rock Springs public lands had increased within this time frame. Judge Kerr assumed that rising
numbers of horses constituted overpopulation a fortiori. The opinion neither cited any scientific
evidence indicating that the horses exceeded the land's carrying capacity, nor demonstrated that the
horses, rather than thelivestock, primarily caused the range deterioration. See id. In order to determine
which organisms exert the greatest pressures on a local ecosystem, one must compare the complex
interrelationships of competing species. This includes analyzing scientific data of the various
organisms' biologies, demographies, behavioral characteristics, nutritional requirements, habitat
preferences, grazing impacts, seasons of use, and effects of competing for the land's available forage.
COMMITTEE OF WILD AND FREE-ROAMING HORSES AND BURROS, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
WILD AND FREE-ROAMING HORSES AND BURROS: CURRENT KNOWLEDGE AND RECOMMENDED

RESEARCH, PHASE I FINAL REPORT 20,
REPORT].

107-08, 201-02 (1980) [hereinafter cited as

PHASE I FINAL

A subsequent order modifying the original decision demonstrates the court's continuing confusion
in interpreting the Act's management requirements. In this amended opinion Judge Kerr erroneously
concluded that all horses above the number agreed upon by the BLM and neighboring landowners were
"excess" animals as defined in § 1332(f) of the Act and thus had to be removed from the region's
checkerboard by the government. Mountain States Legal Found. v. Watt, No. 79-275, at 2-3 (D. Wyo.
Feb. 19, 1982). Also, the court incorrectly suggested that "excess" could be defined as those horses
exceeding the area's population levels "at the time the Act was passed [1971]." Id. at 3. The court
offered another inaccurate definition of "excess" horses as the number specified by a site-specific
environmental impact statement (EIS) prepared pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-61 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Mountain States Legal Found. v.
Watt, No. 79-275, at 2 (D. Wyo. Feb. 19, 1982). None of these interpretations is supported by the
language of the Act or agency regulations. Section 1332(0 defines "excess" horses as those animals
that the Secretary has removed or which must be culled pursuant to the Act's management provisions
"in order to preserve and maintain a thriving natural ecological balance and multiple-use relationship
in that area." 16 U.S.C. § 1332(0 (Supp. V 1981). Agency regulations use the same definition. 43
C.F.R. § 4700.0-5(d) (1981). Nowhere does the Act suggest that "excess" be defined in terms of
private agreements between the BLM and landowners or the 1971 populations. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 133 140 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). EIS's are useful research tools under § 1333(b) to assist the BLM in
assessing whether equine management is necessary, but they are not the sole or definitive device to
establish horse overpopulation. See id. §§ 1333(a)-(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
The MountainStates approach has been applied in comparable cases. See, e.g., C-Punch Corp. v.
Andrus, No. 80-266 (D. Nev. July 29, 1981), modified C-Punch Corp. v. Watt, No. 80-266 (D. Nev.
Nov. 12, 1981).
59. Perhaps the court failed to refer to § 1334 since it would not have supported the massive
removal measures ordered by Judge Kerr.
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Horses on the contiguous public portions of the checkerboard are not
subject to the provision. 61 Landowners could exploit this precedent and §
1334 to coerce the BLM into gathering wild horses from all public and
private plots in an entire region to eliminate forage competition with
livestock. However, the BLM's "ministerial duty" does not apply to public
lands, even if private interests hold grazing permits and leases to use
certain federal tracts.62 Leasing arrangements do not alter the public

ownership of the range,63 so wild horse management on federal sections

should conform to the purposes pervasive throughout the Act, as well as to

PRIA and FLPMA's "multiple use-sustained yield" concepts. The court
improperly ordered removal of the horses from the public lands in the
region.64
Another court seemed to concur with this criticism of Mountain
States. In T Quarter Circle Ranches, Inc. v. Watt,65 the United States

Magistrate's Report and Recommendation to the Nevada District Court
noted that
[s]ection 1334 makes no distinction between the checkerboard
lands and other lands. Certainly, the checkerboard lands are not
uncommon in the West.... Presumably, Congress was aware of
the problems with the checkerboard lands by at least 1978 ... if

not when the Wild Horses Act became law in 1971. Nevertheless,
60. 16 U.S.C. § 1334 (1976).
61. Id. Also, § 1333(a) is not intended to remedy the straying problem. Its purpose is to ensure
that management functions at the "minimal feasible level" to maintain thriving ecological balance
within FLPMA and PRIA. See supra notes 53-57 & accompanying text. Therefore, the court's
reliance upon § 1333(a) to resolve a "§ 1334 problem" was misplaced.
62. Section 1334 mentions leased public lands not in the first sentence, in which the "ministerial
duty" is specified, but in the latter portions of the provision discussing private maintenance of wild
horses. 16 U.S.C. § 1334 (1976). Under this part of § 1334, a landowner is not prohibited from
"maintaining [wild horses] on his private lands, or lands leased from the Government, if he does so in a
manner that protects them from harassment, and if the animals were not willfully removed or enticed
from the public lands." Id. If Congress had desired the mandatory removal requirement to apply to
leased lands as well as to private tracts, then the first sentence of § 1334 would have incorporated the
later references to leased property.
The Secretary of Interior issues such leases and permits pursuant to the Taylor Grazing Act, 43
U.S.C. §§ 315-315r (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
63. "[T] he creation of a grazing district or the issuance of a permit pursuant to the provisions of
[Subchapter I of the Taylor Grazing Act] shall not create any right, title, interest, or estate in or to the
[public] lands." 43 U.S.C. § 315b (1976). See also Holland Livestock Ranch v. United States, 655
F.2d 1002, 1005 (9th Cir. 1981).
64. Of course, the court validly ordered the BLM to gather the horses from the plaintiff's private
property. Section 1334 compels such a result, seesupranotes 32, 39-48 & accompanying text, although
Judge Kerr did not justify the holding on those grounds. See Mountain States Legal Found. v. Andrus,
12 ENVTL. L. RaP. at 20105, asamendedby Mountain States Legal Found. v. Watt, No. 79-275, at 1-3
(D. Wyo. Feb. 19, 1982).
65. No.81-110 (D. Nev. Jan.29,1982),enforcementstayedpendingsettlement,No.81-110 (D.
Nev. July 7, 1982) (interim order).
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at the time Congress amended the Wild and Free-Roaming
Horse Act in October of 1978, it made no amendment of Section
1334 to consider the problems of the checkerboard lands.
Therefore, this matter
is within the province of Congress and not
66
the district court.
According to this interpretation, it would be inappropriate to apply § 1334
to public property within the checkerboard lands, absent congressional
modification of the Act.
The Mountain States rationale essentially sought to bolster a local

economic endeavor.67 This by itself is not objectionable. Nevertheless,
within the context of statutes aspiring to balance multiple uses and attain
maximum productivity from all environmental amenities,68 a decision
which so obviously favors one particular value over another6 9 reduces the
'7 0
goals of FLPMA, PRIA and the Wild Horses Act to mere "lip-service.
A financial analysis indicates that § 1334 can prove quite costly to the
federal taxpayer. As one commentator has mentioned, free-roaming horses
wandering onto unfenced private land may return the day after BLM has
66. Id. at 6. Somewhat inexplicably in the conclusion, the Magistrate contradicted this
language. The Report observed that two previous Nevada cases "concerned checkerboard lands." Id.at
11-12 (citing C-Punch Corp. v. Andrus, No. 80-266 (D. Nev. July 29, 1981), and American Horse
Protection Ass'n v. Andrus, 460 F. Supp. 880 (D. Nev. 1978), vacated & remanded in part,affidin
part,608 F.2d 811 (9th Cir. 1979), appealdismissed,American Horse Protection Ass'n v. Watt, 679
F.2d 150 (9th Cir. 1982)). The Recommendation deferred to judicial precedent, commenting that both
of these courts "found that the Act applies to checkerboard lands." T Quarter Circle Ranches, Inc. v.
Watt, No. 81-110, at 12. Another part of the opinion also suggested that § 1334 should function on
adjacent public and private tracts. Id. at 10-11. However, the Magistrate stated earlier that such a
determination was specifically beyond the courts' "province" and must be defined by Congress. Id.at 6.
How this inconsistency is reconciled is unclear.
The Report, like Mountain States, confused § 1333's management objectives with § 1334's
mandatory duty. See id. at 10-11. Wild horse regulation on public ranges was not designed to
accommodate or implement the needs of single private uses. Seesupranotes 24,26-27,29,52-57,59-64
& accompanying text. When an individual landowner requires a remedy for horse trespass, he should
turn to § 1334 without disrupting the BLM's broader management policies under § 1333.
67. The court emphasized that the increase in wild horses "created severe problems for ranchers
in the Rock Springs area." Mountain States Legal Found. v. Andrus, 12 ENVTL. L. RP,. at 20105. The
tenor of the opinion stresses the need to cull the horses for the benefit of the ranching operations. See id.
68. See supra the discussion of PRIA and FLPMA in notes 52-57 & accompanying text.
69. The Mountain States court implied this partisanship. See supra note 67.
70. One commentator has conveyed a similarly restrictive approach to wildlife management in
general. See Schectman, The "Bambi Syndrome:" How NEPA's Public Participationin Wildlife
Managementis Hurtingthe Environment,8 ENVTL. L. 611 (1978). This concept of wildlife regulation
seems to advance the "least expensive" management most expedient toward a single goal which the
advocate desires. The "cost" analysis is mostly economic and rarely aesthetic, so the preferred objective
often coincides with the money-generating activity. The most salient problem with this analysis is its
subjectivity. Rather than determining which land uses create environmental concerns, it manages a
particular activity to justify a preconceived outcome. This subjugates the essential congressional
intention of FLPMA, within which all federal public land regulation must operate. See supranotes 5257 & accompanying text.
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removed them.7 1 This could entail perpetual governmental roundups.
However, the costs are amplified under the decision in Mountain States,
which requires the BLM, at all taxpayers' expense, to cull wild horses from
public areas upon neighboring private landowners' requests.72 The result is
a significant federal subsidy of a particular landowner's temporary7a use of
public property. Section 1334 insists that the expenditure be made when
horses stray onto private tracts, but there is no compelling reason why4
taxpayers should finance excessive interference with a national resourCe7
to eliminate range competition for a few lessees.
MountainStates produced more than merely a subsidy for a particular range activity. It countermanded a central multiple use tenet found not

only in the Act, but also in FLPMA and PRIA, that bestows upon wild
horses "equal footing" with other public land uses in rangeland management. 5 Mountain States would award livestock a higher priority to graze
the range. Under FLPMA and PRIA's multiple use doctrines, no single use
possesses such a lofty status.7 6
71. Note, supra note 26, at 534-35. Permanent removal of wild horses from a checkerboard
region would be unwarranted. Section 1334 is structured to tackle individual straying episodes after
they have occurred. T Quarter Circle Ranches, Inc. v. Watt, No. 81-110, at 12-13. If the horses
returned to private areas, the owner would again need to request governmental removal. Id.
72. In some instances, BLM revenues may be inadequate to undertake all desired roundups. See,
e.g., Defendant's Memorandum in Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgement and CrossMotion for Summary Judgment, at 3-5, C-Punch Corp. v. Andrus, No. 80-266 (D. Nev. July 29,1981).
73. Under the Taylor Grazing Act, permits to graze the public lands may not be issued for
periods greater than ten years, subject to discretionary renewal by the BLM. 43 U.S.C. § 315b (1976).
74. See generally 16 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976) (Congress' declaration that wild horses "contribute
to the diversity of life forms within the Nation" and "enrich the lives of the American people.").
75. H.R. REP. No. 480, supra note 9, at 5 (stating wild horses "should be considered as
components of the public lands coequal with wildlife and domestic livestock.") (emphasis added);
American Horse Protection Ass'n v. Frizzell, 403 F. Supp. 1206,1220-21 (D. Nev. 1975); 43 C.F.R. §
4700.0-6(c) (1981) ("comparable" status); ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, THE EVOLUTION OF
NATIONA,L WILDLIFE LAW
WILDLIFE LAW].

169-70 (1971) [hereinafter cited as THE

EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL

One commentator contended that the Act assigns horses a superior status in the public land
management process:
[T]he Act did accord wild horses and burros a special status. Ducks, bears, coyotes, and
most other species can be shot on federal lands and their carcasses sold, but all private
killing, molestation, or sale of horses and burros is forbidden. The federal government can
capture or kill the latter animals only in defined, exceptional circumstances. All official
management activities are to be kept to the "minimum feasible level." Congress clearly
intended these restrictions to change the usual way of treating wild horses and burros on the
public domain. While the Act recognizes multiple use management, it injects new priorities
into traditional administrative choice patterns. . . .There is no warrant in the Wild Horses
Act or its legislative history for concluding that cattle or sheep have preference over wild
horses in a conflict over forage. If anything, the Act reflects a contrary congressional
intention.
Coggins, FederalWildlife Law Achieves Adolescense: Developments in the 1970's, 1978 DUKE L.J.
753, 783-84 (footnotes omitted).
76. See American Horse Protection Ass'n v. Frizzell, 403 F. Supp. 1206, 1221 (D. Nev. 1975)
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There are management approaches superior to MountainStates that
blend private uses of public rangelands and protection of wild horses. The
following sections propose and explain such techniques.
IV.

MANAGEMENT RESPONSES TO THE STRAYING PROBLEM

The Wild Horses Act has existing mechanisms that could limit equine
access to private lands and circumvent the need for perennial roundups and
extensive regulation. These include (1) removing "excess" wild horses in
overpopulated regions; (2) fencing to separate public and private tracts in
areas horses frequently roam; and (3) establishing cooperative agreements
between the government and landowners to allow wild horses to stray and
to graze on private lands. 77
"Excess" horses, as determined by the BLM,7 8 could be removed from
public portions of the checkerboard regions in "'peakstray areas."7 9
Section 1333(a) mandates that such culling be at the "minimal feasible
level," 80 and § 1333(b) limits roundups to "excess" horses, within the
overall framework of FLPMA and PRIA, to achieve thriving ecological
balance for multiple environmental values. 81 Consequently, roundups on
public lands to eliminate horse trespass onto private parcels should only be
pursued on a very restricted basis at locations experiencing continual
straying. Under § 1333, "peak stray area roundups" can be distinguished
from the judicial remedies in MountainStates and C-Punch Corporation
(examining regulations under the Classification and Multiple Use Act, Pub. L. No. 88-607, 78 Stat.
986 (1964) (authority terminated 1970)); THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW, supranote
75, at 172-73.
77. Legislation currently before Congress would create a fourth solution to straying. The bill
would permit the BLM to sell culled horses to commercial interests. S. 457, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. §
3(b)(2)(C)-(D), 129 CONG. REC. S1068, S1069 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1983). Applying the Mountain
States rationale, horses removed from checkerboard lands could be sold. If enacted, this proposal would
enable the federal government to pursue and facilitate the very commercial exploitation that the Act
sought to eliminate in the private sector. The bill's provision appears to contradict the Act's central
scheme to protect wild horses from intensive human interference. S. REP. No. 242, supra note 9, at
2152; H.R. REP. No. 480, supra note 9, at 4-5. H. CONF. REP. No. 681, supra note 9, at 2159-60.
78. For the Act's and the BLM's definitions of "excess" horses, see supra note 58. To most
accurately assess whether an "excess" number exists, the Secretary must maintain current inventories
of wild horse populations in various regions, consult governmental wildlife agencies and independent
horse and wildlife experts, and contract with non-governmental personnel, as recommended by the
National Academy of Sciences, to conduct scientific studies. 16 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(1)-(3) (Supp. V
1981). The significance of these research requirements in wild horse management is discussed in
Buckley & Buckley, supra note 26, at 439-41.
79. A "peak stray area" might include private territory upon which wild horses regularly or
constantly trespass. For a suggestion as to how this term could be applied, see infra notes 84-86 &
accompanying text.
80. 16 U.S.C. § 1333(a) (1976).
81. Id. § 1333(b) (Supp. V 1981). See supranotes 52-57 & accompanying text for a review of
the roles of FLPMA and PRIA in horse regulation.
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v. Andrus, 82 since these courts prescribed much more massive regulation
on public lands than the Act tolerates.8"
Some of the scientific studies authorized under § 1333(b) 84 should
help clarify horse land-use patterns which will assist the BLM in isolating
peak stray areas.85 This research data should enable the BLM to determine
more accurately horse populations and thus protect the animals from

uninformed, overzealous management. 88
These scientific studies would also prove significant in the fencing of
public and private lands. Fencing between all checkerboard segments
could be prohibitively expensive. 87 This also would be unnecessary, since

wild horses roam within their own limited "home ranges" 88 and would

likely stray repeatedly across the same territory. Fencing peak stray areas,

however, would be an effective trespass barrier and could be less costly than
removal at some locations. 89
Another management method to resolve the straying problem is §
13 36 of the Act, which provides that "[t] he Secretary is authorized to enter
into cooperative agreements with other landowners and with the State and
local governmental agencies" 90 to permit wild horses to roam and graze on
private or state lands.9 The Act continues to fully protect the horses under

82. No. 80-266 (D. Nev. July 29, 198 1), modified, C-Punch Corp. v. Watt, No. 80-266 (D. Nev.
Nov. 12, 1981).
83. See supranotes 51-64,67-74 & accompanying text. For example, Judge Kerr compelled an
indiscriminateculling of all wild horses from an entire checkerboard region. See Mountain States
Legal Found. v. Andrus, 12 ENVTL. L. REP. at 20105, asamendedby Mountain States Legal Found. v.
Watt, No. 79-275, at 2-3 (D. Wyo. Feb. 19, 1982). The Act, however, allows only "excess" horses to be
gathered from public tracts. 16 U.S.C. § 1333(b) (Supp. V 1981).
84. See id. See also supra note 78.
85. Several of these studies investigate wild horse demography, habitat preference and use
compared to cattle patterns, food consumption rates, nutritional requirements, social, genetic and
population dynamics, and grazing and watershed impacts, as compared with cattle. PHASE I FINAL
REPORT, supranote 58, at 70, 108, 164, 167, 169. The National Academy of Sciences Committee on
Wild Horses outlined several projects to examine these factors. Id. at 108-29.
86. The BLM's inventories of wild horse populations have been criticized in the past. Id. at 190.
See alsoAmerican Horse Protection Ass'n v. Kleppe, 6 ENVTL. L. REP. 20802,20803-04 (ENVTL. L.
INST.) (D.D.C. 1976), affid on rehearing,No. 76-1455 (D.D.C. Nov. 19, 1981), affdin part,rev'din
part and remanded, American Horse Protection Ass'n v. Watt, 694 F.2d 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(characterizing BLM estimates of horse numbers and reproductivity in the Challis, Idaho area as
"meaningless," "speculative" and "unreliable").
87. Note, supra note 26, at 535.
88. See supra note 30 & accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., American Horse Protection Ass'n v. Kleppe, No. 76-1455, at 5-6 (D.D.C. Nov. 19,
1981), affid inpart,rev'd in part and remanded,American Horse Protection Ass'n v. Watt, 694 F.2d
1310 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dissolve Injunction at 13,
American Horse Protection Ass'n v. Kleppe, No. 76-1455 (D.D.C. Nov. 19, 1981).
90. 16 U.S.C. § 1336 (1976).
91. See 43 C.F.R. § 4710.3 (1981); 16 U.S.C. § 1334 (1976).
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such agreements."' The success of this provision would seem to depend
upon the willingness of private property owners to consent to wild horses
grazing their available forage. In times of economic hardship, this genial
disposition might wane. Section 1336 could be more useful in reducing the
straying conflict if landowners received additional incentives to pursue
cooperative agreements.9
Given the number of requests to remove straying wild horses," the
Act's current devices have not been used successfully to reconcile property
owners and free-roaming herds. Imaginative answers need to augment the
present framework.
V.

INNOVATIVE SOLUTIONS TO THE STRAYING PROBLEM

Several novel allurements, such as fiscal benefits and extensions of
grazing privileges, could supplement the Wild Horses Act to encourage
individuals or associations to adopt and to enter into cooperative
agreements.
As "excess" wild horses are removed from peak stray areas, 95 they will
have to be relocated onto other public tracts," placed in holding facilities
for adoption, 97 or humanely destroyed. 8 Adoption has been the most
92. See 16 U.S.C. § 1334 (1976); 43 C.F.R. § 4710.3 (1981). Conceivably, under cooperative
agreements wild horses wandering onto private lands could "intermingle" with domestic horses. This
could create a question of ownership as ranchers attempted to retrieve their property. The Act allows
persons claiming ownership on public lands to recover their horses if the state's branding and estray
laws so permit. 16 U.S.C. § 1335 (1976). Final determination of ownership rests with federal
authorities. American Horse Protection Ass'n v. United States Dep't of Interior, 551 F.2d 432,439-42
(D.C. Cir. 1977); State ex rel. Nevada State Bd. of Agriculture v. United States, No. 78-0076, at 4-6
(D. Nev. March 29, 1979); Sheridan v. Andrus, 465 F. Supp. 662,664 (D. Colo. 1979). See generally
43 C.F.R. §§ 4720.1-.3 (1981). It would seem logical that § 1335 would apply to cooperative
agreements affecting private lands, since the Act extends its protective umbrella to such private
maintenance arrangements. 16 U.S.C. § 1334 (1976).
93. See infra notes 109, 123-25 & accompanying text.
94. For example, the BLM has received 141 requests since 1975 from Nevada property owners
to gather horses from their private rangelands, T Quarter Circle Ranches, Inc. v. Watt, No. 81-110, at
7.
95. See supra notes 78-86 & accompanying text.
96. The Act forbids most relocation: "Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to authorize the
Secretary to relocate wild free-roaming horses or burros to areas of the public lands where they do not
presently exist." 16 U.S.C. § 1339 (1976). However, wild horses could be culled and taken to another
public region which they currently roam.
97. See supranote 26 &accompanying text. Permanent BLM distribution centers are located in
California, Nebraska, Nevada, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming.
"Semi-permanent" centers are utilized periodically in Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, New
Mexico, and Utah. U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management, So You'd Like to
Adopt a Wild Horse. . .Or Burro?, at 3 (May 1982) (adoption pamphlet available from the Consumer
Information Center, Pueblo, Colorado). See also FOURTH REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 26, at 6.
98. According to the BLM, less than three percent of all captured horses are destroyed. TmaRD
REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 6, at 12.
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9
widely utilized procedure to dispose of horses following roundups."
Recently, the BLM increased adoption fees. 100 This might dampen public
interest and subsequently reduce the number of horses placed into private
maintenance. Fewer adoptions would probably result in the termination of
more culled horses. 101 So long as the BLM continues to remove wild horses
from public or checkerboard regions, the Adopt-a-Horse program is the
solution most closely approaching the Act's protective and regulatory
intentions while easing rangeland ecological pressures associated with
horse overpopulation and straying.102 Financial incentives should be
constructed to accommodate would-be custodians who might balk at the
high fees. It seems anomalous to saddle private citizens attempting to
further the goals of the Act with the program's economic burdens. The
success of the congressional policy to protect wild horses should not depend
upon the generosity of a small portion of the public that could afford the
higher fees. Since Congress declared wild horse preservation to be a truly

Even though § 1333(b) allows humane destruction, such termination rarely should be utilized as a
method of regulating horse populations, since the objective of the Act is to prevent human slaughter of
the animals. See supra notes 14-15, 19-29 & accompanying text.
99. See supra note 26 & accompanying text.
100. 48 Fed. Reg. 9260 (1983) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. §§ 4740.4-2 to -3). Adoption
applicants must pay a "custodial fee" of $125 per horse and $75 per burro plus transportation costs to
the holding facility. Id. at 9262 (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. §4740.4-3(d)(1)). Previously, fees had been
limited to $25 per animal. Haitch, 'Orphan'Horses,N.Y. Times, April 25, 1982, § 1, at 49, col. 5-6. As
of October, 1980, overall expenses to the adopter, including vaccination, handling and transportation
costs, averaged $90-$160. BLM FOUR-YEAR AUTHORIZATION REPORT, supra note 26, at 94.
Originally the BLM proposed that the adoption fees for horses be increased to $200 per animal. 47
Fed. Reg. 32,406 (1982). Eighty-four percent of the 199 public comments the agency received in
response to the suggested rulemaking were opposed to this figure,
primarily because the writers believed the proposed fee for horses would reduce the number
of animals adopted, limit removal of excess wild horses from the public lands, make it
difficult for fixed or lower income individuals to adopt animals, equal or exceed the local
market value of domestic horses, lead to destruction of healthy animals, and increase
adoption program costs.
48 Fed. Reg. 9260,9260 (1983). Only ten percent of the public comments supported the $200 fee. Id.
Last year's suggested fees were the subject of recent litigation. American Horse Protection Ass'n v.
Watt, No. 82-0559 (D.D.C. June 30, 1982) (stipulation between parties to stay judicial proceedings
pending completion of informal rulemaking under 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976)). The BLM agreed not to
destroy any horses until 30 days after publication of the final adoption charges in the FederalRegister,
id., which became effective March 4, 1983. 48 Fed. Reg. 9260, 9260 (1983).
101. Haitch, supranote 100, at 49, col. 5-6. The BLM contended that the $125 fee "will permit
an increase in the number of horses adopted," and the $75 price tag would not reduce the adoption
demand for burros. 48 Fed. Reg. 9260, 9261 (1983). Considering that horses and burros previously
-have been adopted for $25 or less, see Haitch,supranote 100, at 49, col. 5-6, it seems more likely that a
price escalation of between $50-$100 per animal under the new fees will have some negative impact on
adoption demand.
102. Evidence suggests that the program has been abused by commercial exploiters who
"adopt" the horses and then sell them to industrial manufacturers. See Adopt-a-Horse Program:
HearingBeforethe Subcomm. on GovernmentalEfficiency andthe Districtof Columbiaof the Senate
Comm. on GovernmentalAffairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 26,39,42 (1979); Note, supranote 26, at 537.
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national concern, 03 perhaps a larger fiscal pool could be tapped to defray
some of the adoption costs.
A special public lands user fee could be established to subsidize horse
adoption or management endeavors. The duty could be assessed to those

uses which directly compete with wild horses for range resources and which
would specifically benefit from horse removal from checkerboard re-

gions. 0 Such a charge could be nominal and still generate significant
revenues. For example, assume Congress authorized a duty analogous to
the grazing fees under PRIA, in which domestic livestock operators are
charged to graze the public lands. 10 5 To simplify the illustration, suppose
the duty equals ten cents per head of livestock grazed annually. Since
nearly 4.5 million domestic livestock graze on 170 million acres of public
range,106 the fee theoretically would generate $450,000. This would

account for 75 percent of the adoption program's expenditure in fiscal year
1981.107 To raise additional dollars, this hypothetical charge could be
extended to other private uses of the public lands.108 These subsidies could
103. See 16 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976).
104. For example, livestock grazing the public lands would restrict forage availability for horses
and wildlife. Also, grazing interests would obtain the direct benefit of reduced range competition as
horses are culled. Since grazing fees under PRIA charge ranchers the economic value they derive from
use of the public tracts, seeinfranote 105, an extension of a wild horse duty to livestock activities would
seem logical.
105. Under PRIA,
[flor the grazing years 1979 through 1985, the Secretaries of Agriculture and Interior shall
charge the fee for domestic livestock grazing on the public rangelands which Congress finds
represents the economic value of the use of the land to the user, and under which Congress
finds fair market value for public grazing equals the $1.23 base established by the 1966
Western Livestock Grazing Survey multiplied by the result of the Forage Value Index
(computed annually from data supplied by the Economic Research Service) added to the
Combined Index (Beef Cattle Price Index minus the Price Paid Index) and divided by 100:
Provided,That the annual increase or decrease in such fee for any given yearshall be limited
to not more than plus or minus 25 per centum of the previous year's fee.
43 U.S.C. § 1905 (Supp. V 1981). FLPMA also authorizes the Secretary to set grazing fees. 43 U.S.C.
§ 1751 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
106. TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 1981, at 146 (1981). Realistically, not all of this livestock would compete with wild
horses.
107. Of the Act's fiscal 1981 budget of $1,160,000, $400,000 was spent to remove "excess"
horses, and $600,000 was utilized "to place the gathered horses in private care." T Quarter Circle
Ranches, Inc. v. Watt, No. 81-110, at 8.
108. For example, energy development industries operating in federal regions, and recreational
facilities within national parks, could be assessed meagre charges. The larger the pool of uses assessed,
the lower the fee can be for each category. Using the cattle illustration, see supratext accompanying
notes 105-06, a charge of one cent or less per head of cattle, coupled with comparable fees for other
public range uses, could generate tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars in revenue. To justify the
application of such fees, presumably there might have to be a reasonable relationship between the
activity charged and the benefit derived (e.g., wild horse adoption). The Property Clause, U.S. CONST.
art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, implies that such a connection ought to exist. For example, Congress has provided the
Secretary of Interior broad discretion under various statutes to regulate federal lands and resources for
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bolster the Adopt-a-Horse program and would enable "excess" horses to be

gathered from peak stray areas without needless destruction of the
animals. The straying problem would be pared, and the horses would be at
least partially spared human interference and depradation.
Another economic allurement could be the creation of a special
federal tax deduction or tax credit for wild horse adoption expenses.109
Under the present tax code, custodians probably could not deduct their

adoption costs because most adopters are not engaged in the business of
raising wild horses for a profit."10 The deductions afforded "not-for-profit"
enterprises"' do not apply to the ordinary custodian, since these costs are
not outlays deductible without regard to the "business-for-profit" requirement. 1 2 The Wild Horses Act could also preclude deduction of one's outof-pocket adoption expenses. Adopters cannot obtain title to adopted
horses until after one year of humane care," *3 and deductions would have 14to
be taken during the tax year that the adoption costs were accrued.
Congress would have to specifically declare a tax advantage for
adoption if the federal tax system is to be of service. A new deduction could
spur individuals to adopt while simultaneously furthering the Act's
the benefit of the general public. Hannifinv. Morton, 444 F.2d 200,202 (10th Cir. 1971); United States
v. Ohio Oil Co., 163 F.2d 633,639-40(10th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 833 (1948). This includes
the power to assess user fees to guarantee that the federal government exacts a "fair return" from
persons exploiting resources from the public lands. Hannifin v. Morton, 444 F.2d 200, 202 (10th Cir.
1971); Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Watt, 517 F. Supp. 1209 (D.D.C. 1981). This delegated proprietary
authority is a valid exercise of Congress' power to "make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting"
federal lands under the Property Clause. United States v. Ohio Oil Co., 163 F.2d 633,639-40 (10th Cir.
1947), cert. denied,333 U.S. 833 (1948). Arguably, to be a "needful" regulation "respecting" federal
property, there should be a nexus between the regulated activity and the public land management goal
to be achieved through the establishment of use charges.
109. Such tax benefits could be extended to landowners entering cooperative arrangements
under § 1336 of the Act.
110. Usually the costs of activities "not engaged in for profit" are not deductible. See I.R.C. §
183(a), (c) (1982). Generally, tax deductions are allowed for "all the ordinary and necessary expenses
paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business." Id. § 162(a).
111. See id. §183(b).
112. See id.
113. 16 U.S.C. § 1333(c) (Supp. V 1981).
114. See I.R.C. § 162(a) (1982). There are some instances in which the federal tax code allows
deduction for certain expenditures even if the taxpayer does not "own" the property he has purchased.
In the case of land sales on contract, while purchaser B takes possession of the parcels for his use, vendor
A retains legal title until B pays the full contract price, frequently over a period of several years. See
generallyC. SMITH & R. BOYER, supranote 8, at 154. In the interim B still may deduct state and local
property taxes from his federal return. I.R.C. § 164(a)(1) (1982). The Internal Revenue Code also
enables a taxpayer to deduct business payments required as a condition to his continued use of property
to which he has not taken or is not taking title or equity. Id. § 162(a)(3). Similarly, a transfer of
possession of wild horses without conveyance of legal title would still provide the adopter an equitable
interest in the animals which, by analogy to the above tax provisions, could be sufficient "ownership" to
maintain a "year of purchase" deduction for custodial expenses at the time of adoption. This assumes,
of course, that adoption fees can qualify as deductible expenses under the Code.
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preservation of the animals.115 Precedents exist to support the creation of a
tax incentive for the protection of animal life. 1 6 One state statute provides
an extremely low property tax assessment for real property owners wishing
to classify qualified lands as wildlife habitats. 17 Another state exempts
from real property taxation land owned by organizations using the

property for certain charitable endeavors,"18 including environmental and
conservation objectives,"19 such as a wild bird sanctuary. 20 The Internal
Revenue Code authorizes deductions for charitable contributions to
organizations established for the prevention of cruelty to animals.' 2 While
tax laws may be an unusual tool to protect wildlife in general or horses in
particular, it is not an unreasonable expansion of their central mission to
12 2
effectuate an important social policy.

115. Any deductions or credits would have to be carefully structured to prevent commercial
exploiters from abusing the tax code while profiting from the horses' destruction. Since only four horses
may be adopted per person annually, unless the Secretary authorizes otherwise, it is unlikely that
business interests would derive enough economic benefit from either resale of the horses or from a tax
deduction to justify adoption abuse. See 16 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(2)(B) (Supp. V 1981).
116. This article recommends such a tax policy be applied to wild horses. The precedents
mentioned below illustrate that tax structures have been used to pursue the societal goals of the
preservation and protection of animals. See infra notes 117-22 & accompanying text.
117. E.g., IND. CODE §§ 6-1.1-6.5-1 to -25 (1982). If particular parcels of land qualify as a
wildlife habitat, see id. § 6-1.1-6.5-2, the property is assessed at a rate of S1.00 per acre "for general
property taxation purposes." Id. § 6-1.1-6.5-8.
118. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 420-a (McKinney Supp. 1982).
119. New York Botanical Garden v. Assessors of Washington, 55 N.Y.2d 328, 336,434 N.E.2d
703,706, 449 N.Y.S.2d 467,470 (1982); North Manursing Wildlife Sanctuary, Inc. v. City of Rye, 48
N.Y.2d 135,139-40,397 N.E.2d 693,695,422 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3 (1979), affidon remand, 75 A.D.2d 855,
427 N.Y.S.2d 843 (1980); Mohonk Trust v. Board of Assessors of Gardiner, 47 N.Y.2d 476,484,392
N.E.2d 876, 880, 418 N.Y.S.2d 763, 767 (1979).
120. North Manursing Wildlife Sanctuary, Inc. v. City of Rye, 48 N.Y.2d 135, 139-40, 397
N.E.2d 693, 695, 422 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3 (1979), affd on remand, 75 A.D.2d 855, 427 N.Y.S.2d 843
(1980). For a detailed analysis of New York's charitable real property tax exemptions, see P. Swords,
Charitable Real Property Tax Exemptions in New York State (1981).
121. I.R.C. §§ 170(a)(1), (c)(2)(B) (1982). Organizations for prevention of cruelty to animals
can be designated as tax-exempt under the Code. Id. § 501(c)(3).
122. The national significance of the Wild Horses Act is suggested in § 1331's declaration of
congressional policy. See supra notes 22, 74 & accompanying text.
There are several other sections of the Internal Revenue Code that are specifically tailored to
achieve various environmental objectives. The Hazardous Substance Response Revenue Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-510, tit. II, §§ 211 (a), (c), 94 Stat. 2797 (1980), levied a tax on crudeoil, see 26 U.S.C. §
4611 (Supp. V 1981), and on manufactured chemicals, see id. § 4661, to raise revenues for
"Superfund" pursuant to42 U.S.C. § 9631(b)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1981), to respond to injury claims and
costs related to releases of oil and hazardous substances into the environment. Id. § 9631 (c). Another
"environmental" tax provision includes the amortized deduction that pollution control facilities may
elect under I.R.C. § 169 (1982). Also, businesses investing in certain types of energy property, such as
solar, wind, ocean and geothermal, are entitled to an investment credit as an incentive to develop
alternatives to fossil fuels. Id. § 46(a). Another tax section allows landowners to deduct contributions of
full or partial real property interests to charitable organizations so long as the property is used for
"conservation purposes," including "the protection of a relatively natural fish, wildlife or plant
habitat." Id. § 170(f)(3)(B)(iii), (h)(4)(A)(ii). Clearly, Congress has demonstrated that the federal
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Extensions of grazing permits and leases for landowners 123 entering
cooperative agreements under § 1336 could also ease the straying problem,
since such arrangements would diminish the number of requests BLM
receives to return strays to the public range. 124 Even if the BLM normally
allows permits and leases to continue automatically, absent a serious cause
for cancellation, extensions still could be preferentially given to parties
opting for cooperative engagements. 25
Another approach to the straying conflict would be an increase in the
number of "wild horse ranges." From a practical standpoint, merely
designating an area of the public lands as a horse refuge would not affect
existing relations between wild horses and landowners. Horses could still
cross public and private borderlines, regardless of the label assigned to the
region. If these ranges are to prove effective in easing the straying problem,
they should be defined to coincide with the horses' territorial use patterns so
that the animals would normally remain within the refuge boundaries.1 " 6
Fencing would still be useful in peak stray areas between the range and
private property.1 27 Straying could continue despite the establishment of
refuges. As equine populations increase near the range boundaries, horses
might be compelled to migrate in search of greater food supplies. While
fencing would prevent the animals from entering private tracts, the horses
could be forced to roam beyond the refuge at other unfenced locations or to
move toward the center of the designated range. If forage remained sparse,
and if geographic characteristics and fencing hindered herd movements,
the horses might begin to exhaust the refuge's resources, at least on
relatively small ranges. 2 " The BLM could respond with continued
roundups, which would reinstate the current practice rather than improve
upon it. Still, such ranges would provide a haven specifically created to
preserve the horses' needs. Such a "preferred status" within the assigned
range 129 would require the BLM to utilize alternative management
tax system is an appropriate instrument to attain ecological protection.
123. The Secretary of the Interior has the discretion to regulate and renew leases and permits. 43
U.S.C. § 315b (1976).
124. Since § 1334 does not apply to public tracts, there is some question whether cooperative
agreements should be necessary to protect wild horses on the public parcels. See supra notes 59-66 &
accompanying text.
125. The Taylor Grazing Act provides preferences in issuing renewals. 43 U.S.C. § 315b (1976).
126. See supra note 30 & accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 87-89 & accompanying text.
128. This would not be a problem in the larger wild horse refuges, since the "border herds" would
likely have ample space to roam within range boundaries.
129. While this priority in land use would exist within the particular wild horse refuge, no such

exalted status would be awarded horses on "ordinary" public lands. See supra notes 75-76 &
accompanying text.
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options 30 before removing the animals from the refuge.
Special refuges rarely have been used in the past,131 and particular
ranges have been criticized as ineffective in protecting the horses' interests.13 2 Congress explicitly discouraged the establishment of ranges, since
these would involve intensive management creating a "zoo-like" effect
contrary to the free-roaming nature of the animals. 133 The Act was
intended to preserve wild horses within their natural, rather than artificial,
habitats.' 3 ' However, one may reasonably question whether wild horses
function in a truly "natural" environment under current management
procedures. Since 1971 the BLM has conducted frequent, substantial
roundups of herds from public lands, and the agency proposes to continue
such policies.3 5 This widespread human interference generates the same
"zoo-like" result that Congress wished to avoid, because wild horses are
culled and placed within BLM holding facilities to await adoption or
destruction.13 6 While designated ranges would concentrate the horses'
territories, they would be superior to continual roundups resulting in a
"corral ecosystem." Congress should reconsider its aversion toward
refuges and should contemplate amending the Act to facilitate their
implementation.'
VI.

CONCLUSION

Section 1334 of the Wild Horses Act provides landowners an
inexpensive and convenient method of removing straying horses from their
private property. The BLM is under a "ministerial duty" to return the
horses to the public range. However, this obligation does not compel culling

from public portions of checkerboard tracts. Such exorbitant regulation is
130. For example, in a horse range, the BLM could alleviate resource deterioration by first
reducing livestock grazing or by increasing "on-the-ground" improvements under PRIA. 43 U.S.C. §§
1903-04 (Supp. V 1981). Thereafter, if horse numbers needed to be thinned pursuant to the Wild
Horses Act, roundups could be conducted.
131. THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW, supranote 75, at 169-70 n. 164. Only three
ranges had been established as of 1980. Wild Horse & Burro Report, supra note 29, at 1.
132. H. RYDEN, supra note 16, at 262-78.
133. H. CONF. REP. No. 681, supranote 9, at 2159; H.R. REP. No. 480, supra note 9, at 4-5.
134. S. REP. No. 242, supranote 9, at 2151; H.R. REP. No. 480, supra note 9, at 4-5; H. CONF.
REP. No. 681, supra note 9, at 2159.
135. As of September 1981, the BLM and the Forest Service have captured approximately
38,200 "excess" horses and burros since the Act's inception. FOURTH REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra
note 26, at 4. The BLM recommended that 24,000 "excess" horses be culled in fiscal years 1980 and

1981. Thereafter, removal would be continued at a rate of over 10,000 horses annually. THIRD REPORT
supra note 6, at 11, 25.

TO CONGRESS,

136.

See supra notes 97-98 & accompanying text.

137. Early versions of the Wild Horses Act suggested that at least twelve ranges be created.
Protection Hearings, supra note 36, at 17-18 (statement of Gilbert Gude, U.S. Representative,

Maryland).
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contrary to the Act's requirements that horse management be conducted at
minimum feasible levels, and it usurps the "multiple use-sustained yield"
philosophy of the Act, FLPMA, and PRIA, that seeks to accommodate all
range uses to attain thriving ecological balance. Excessive, perpetual
roundups on the public lands should not be the primary approach to
eliminate straying. "Excess" horses could be gathered, and fencing could
be constructed, in peak stray areas. Cooperative agreements between
landowners and the BLM would enable wild horses to graze on private and
checkerboard lands without constant removal. Innovative economic solutions, such as special tax deductions and user fee subsidies for horse
custodians, could increase the number of adoptions, so that animals
removed from "peak stray roundups" would not need to be destroyed. Tax
advantages and preferential extensions of grazing permits and leases could
encourage property holders to enter cooperative agreements. Designated
wild horse ranges could be increasingly utilized. These refuges, coupled
with "peak stray fencing," could reduce straying if boundaries correspond
to the horses' nomadic patterns of use.
There are many alternatives more consistent with the purposes of the
Wild Horses Act than perennial roundups from public and private lands
pursuant to § 1333 and § 1334. The BLM will hopefully undertake such
options more vigorously, and perhaps Congress will ponder some of the
novel devices available, so that the integrity of private land uses may be
preserved, and wild horses may continue to be protected as truly "freeroaming" symbols of American history.

